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This thesis examines the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) from
a personnel manning and supply and logistic support
perspective. The history of the RRF and a discussion of
its current status are included. Specifically examined is
the decline in the number of merchant mariners and in the
number of available billets for the mariners. Three
merchant marine manning studies are evaluated and five
alternatives for guaranteeing manning are discussed. In
the area of supply and logistic support, the onboard shore
and ship spare part inventories are evaluated for
fulfillment of RRF requirements. Recommendations
concerning manning include taking measures to increase the
size of the U.S. flag fleet, manning Naval Auxiliary ships
with merchant mariners, and establishing a civilian
Merchant Marine Reserve program. Recommendations
concerning supply and logistic support are made to expedite
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The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has defined
strategic sealift as
"the afloat preposit ioning and ocean movenient of
materials, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), and
personnel, in support of assigned logistic support
missions of the U.S. Government, including the necessary
handling systems and personnel to ensure delivery of
cargo ashore." [Ref. l;p. 1]
Strategic sealift support for a contingency is met
through three types of shipping: preposit ioned, surge, and
resupply. Each type is discussed briefly below:
1. Preposit ioned - Preposit ioned shipping is the most
responsive. Military equipment has been loaded
aboard a ship and that ship has been preposit ioned
near a contingency area. In the event of a
contingency, these ships are directed to a port to
deliver their cargo to military forces which have
been airlifted into the theater of operations.
Examples of preposit ioned shipping are the Maritime
Preposit ioned Squadrons and the Near-Term
Preposit ioned Forces.
2. Surge - Surge shipping begins immediately following
the National Command Authorities decision to deploy
forces. Surge shipping provides "the bulk of CONUS-
based equipment and initial sustaining supplies"
[Ref. l:p. 4]. The assets which provide surge
shipping lift are primarily government-controlled
vessels and available commercial vessels. The ships
of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) have been designated
for surge shipping.
3. Resupply - Resupply shipping immediately follows
surge shipping and provides the majority of
sustaining supplies to support the deployed forces.
Resupply shipping will also support Navy Battle
groups by replenishing station ships of the Mobile
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Logistics Support Force. Resupply shipping continues
for the duration of the conflict. Assets used for
resupply shipping include available commercial assets
and the use of preposit ioned and surge ships
following their initial discharges. [Ref. l:pp. 4, 5]
B. STATEKENT OF THE PROBLEM
The RRF is an offspring of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF) . These ships are maintained in a 5-, 10-, or
20-day readiness status. In times of crises or
mobilization, RRF ships will be utilized as both surge
shipping and resupply shipping assets. From time to time,
RRF ships are individually activated to test their
abilities to perform an assigned mission or simply to test
their seaworthiness within a specified time period. To
date, an activation of the entire force (currently 86
ships) has not been tested.
If the entire fleet were activated, logistics problems
of major dimensions could be expected. Manning for the
ships would come primarily from the private sector.
However, in recent years, there has been a steady decline
in the number of billets for seafarers and, therefore, a
fewer number of men and women entering the seafaring
community. Another- manning problem revolves around the age
of the ships. Many of these ships are more than 20 years
old and have steam-powered engines. Today' s engineers are
being trained in diesel engines. Many young deck hands
have no experience in working the winches on self-
10
sustaining ships. This decline in numbers and the training
of the seafarers could adversely affect the manning of the
RRF ships.
Supply support for these ships could also become a
major problem. The term "supply support" can be defined as
the determination of requirements and the acquisition and
distribution of all required material. A full inventory of
required spares has never been completed for all RRF
ships. Only the Military Sealift Command (MSC) retired
ships have a Consolidated Shipboard Allowance (COSAL)
onboard. The remaining ships, which have been purchased on
the commercial market or have been upgraded from the NDRF,
have to rely on past history or builders' specifications
for onboard spares. Currently, available spares vary from
ship to ship. There is no standard supply system for the
RRF and no interface with the Navy's supply system.
C. LIMITATIONS
The status of the RRF changes on almost a daily basis
with the addition and deletion of ships. Also the RRF
program itself is in a period of change as certain
responsibilities are changing hands among the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) , the Military Sealift Command (MSC),
and the CNO' s Strategic Sealift Division <0F-42). The




This thesis shall examine specifically the ability of
the RRF to perform its mission in view of the probable
logistic problems of manning and supply support. Chapter
II provides a history of the NDRF, the parent organization
of the RRF, and the RRF. Chapter III describes the RRF
program as it currently exists - manning agreements, supply
support, activations, etc. Chapter IV examines the manning
issues surround these ships. First, the decline in
merchant mariner sailing positions is explained and the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) minimum manning requirements are
described. Next, three merchant marine manning studies are
examined and their conclusions presented. Finally, five
manning concepts are discussed as possible means of
expanding the merchant marine labor force. Chapter V
examines the supply and logistic support requirements of
the RRF. The three elements of supply support are defined
and the availability of each of these elements is
discussed. Overseas logistic support is examined and the
questions of who will support the RRF and where it will be
supported, are answered. The last issue presented is
Sealift Enhancement Features (SEF) . This portion describes
what SEF are being added to RRF ships and at what cost.
Chapter VI provides the conclusions and recommendations to
the manning and supply support issues presented.
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I I
. THE HISTORY OF THE READY RESERVE FORCE
A. CREATION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
Although the RRF was established only 11 years ago in
1976, the idea of a reserve fleet dates back to the end of
World War II. At the end of the war, the U.S. government
owned over 5,000 cargo ships. To reduce the size of this
government-owned fleet, Congress passed the Merchant Ship
Sales Act of 1946. This Act authorized the sale of these
ships first to American buyers and then to foreign
nationals. The trade-in of older vessels for credit
towards the purchase of a newer war-built ship was also
authorized.
After all buyers had made their purchases, a large
number of ships still remained in the government's fleet;
therefore, the Act was amended so that those ships which
were not sold would enter a newly established National
Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). The Act stated that the
Maritime Commission was to "place in a national defense
reserve such vessels owned by it as, after consultations
with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, it
deems should be retained for national defense." [Ref. 2]
However, the act which created the NDRF did not limit the
use of these ships to defense purposes. Congress
13
appropriated funds to the U.S. Maritime Commission for the
preservation and maintenance of these ships. When the
commission was abolished in 1950, control of the NDRF was
turned over to the newly established Maritime
Administration (MARAD). Eight NDRF anchorage sites were
established at Astoria, OR; Olympia, VA; Beaumont, TX,
James River, VA; Suisun Bay, CA; Mobile, AL; Hudson River,
NY; and Wilmington, NC.
The legislation authorizing the sale of the reserve
ships to operators for commercial trade purposes expired on
January 15, 1951. From that date on, the reserve ships
could only be "sold for scrap or for non-transportation
purposes or broken out only in time of a national emergency
or when their use was demonstrably necessary to support
U.S. national interests." [Ref. 3: p. 28]
B. SELECTED NDRF ACTIVATIONS
1
. Korean Var
The first activation of the NDRF ships began in
1950. The U.S. Merchant fleet provided the initial lift
capacity to support the U.S. efforts in Korea. However,
with the activation of the NDRF, U.S. liner firms were able
to return to and continue providing service on their
peacetime trade routes. A total of 778 NDRF ships were
activated over an eighteen month period [Ref. 3: p. 293.
The ships were operated under General Agency
Agreements cGAA) . A private operator was responsible for
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the crewing, overseeing of repairs, and provisioning of the
ships under its contract. Because the ships were fairly
new, the activation process was accomplished in as little
as two days. Spare parts were generally available from the
U.S. manufacturers of the equipment.
Manpower shortages was a critical problem during
this period. In June 1950, there were 57,000 sea-going
billets. One year later, there were 87,000 billets, a 53%
increase. The plentiful, high-paying Jobs ashore together
with the uncertainty of future careers at sea resulted in a
large number of trained seaman not responding to the call
for mariners. The shortages were in licensed radio
operators, engineers, and able-bodied seamen. The
shortages delayed numerous sailings. [Ref. 4: p. 40]
2
. Grain Storage
In early 1953, a shortage of storage space existed
for suplus grain. On March 11, 1953, the Department of
Agriculture requested permission to use 50 Liberty ships of
the NDRF for surplus grain storage. By February 1954,
MARAD turned over 317 ships in which 72 million bushels of
grain were stored. The grain storage program lasted for 10
years. Throughout the program, ships were loaded,
discharged, and then reloaded. At its peak in 1959, 400
NDRF ships were utilized to store 136 million bushels of
grain. [Ref. 3: p. 29]
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3. Suez Canal Crisis
When the Suez Canal was closed in 1956, the NDRF
ships were activated once again. Ships, which normally
navigated the canal, were required to go around the Cape of
Good Hope. This resulted in the doubling or tripling of
the nautical miles travelled by a vessel. Accordingly,
shipping rates sky-rocketed. The NDRF ships were used to
increase available tonnage and to drive down overall world




In 1965, the shortage of commercial vessels to
support U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia forced the
Department of Defense (DoD) to request the activation of 14
NDRF ships. By the end of 1966, 161 NDRF ships were
operating under General Agency Agreements. More than 30%
of all cargo to Southeast Asia was moved in these ships.
In 1970, the last of the activated ships were returned to
the NDRF for further retention or future scrapping.
The age of the ships was beginning to show and
impede their usage. The activation of the first 14 ships
averaged 21 days each. These ships were worked on around
the clock and shortcuts which were allowed by safety
requirements were taken. Many of the activated ships
suffered engineering casualties, most of which occurred
within the first three months of operations [Ref. 5: p. 27].
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As during the Korean conflict, manpower shortages
adversely impacted sailing operations. Between 1965 and
1968, approximately 42% of the scheduled sailings were
delayed due to personnel shortages. Reasons for the
personnel shortages were attributed to
1. Lack of sufficient number of qualified crew.
2. Generous vacations requiring greater numbers of
crews.
3. Reluctance to sail on older ships.
4. High attrition of licensed officers due to long
periods at sea, high average ages and eligibility
for retirement.
5. Inability of MARAD to have maritime personnel exempt
from military service. [Ref. 5: p. 30]
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RRF
By the mid-1970' s, most of the ships in the NDRF were
approximately 30 years old. These ships, however, were
becoming more important for defense purposes. As the
number of breakbulk ships in the U.S. merchant fleet was
declining, the reliance on the NDRF ships as militarily-
useful ships was increasing. At the same time, the
quantity and quality of the ships in the NDRF were
decreasing. Table 1 shows the decline from 1945-1976.
Only three (Beaumont, TX, James River, VA, and Suisun Bay,
CA) of the original eight ports still had ships. The value
of a reserve fleet was not questioned. The past
activations from the Korean to the Vietnam War had proven
the usefulness of the reserve fleet concept.
17
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MARAD and the Navy began to question the ability to
activate these ships in a short period of time. In 1976,
KARAD officials optimistically estimated a minimum of 22
days for activation of a Victory ship from the Beaumont, TX
fleet; 20 days for a Victory ship from the James River, VA
fleet; and 27 days for a Victory ship from Suisun Bay, CA
[Ref. 5: pp. 7, 8, 10]. With activations ranging from a
minimum of 20 days, these ships would not be able to
support DoD shipping in the early stages of a contingency.
The lengthy activation periods are a result of
1. Average age over 30 years
2. Ships in same condition as when laid up
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3. Preservation and maintenance of NDRF ships does not
include repairs, refitting, major overhauls, et
cetera
4. Availability of ship repair and dry dock facilities
[Ref. 6:p. 421
To solve this problem, the Navy and the Department of
Commerce (MARAD) signed a Memorandum of Understanding in
November 1976 to provide for the upgrade of a portion of
the NDRF. The upgraded ships would be called the Ready
Reserve Force. Thirty Victory ships were chosen for the
program. The upgrade was based on a Four Phased Plan:
Phase 1 - Preact i vat ion - perform work so that actual
activation may be accomplished in the five to
ten day requirement.
Phase 2 - Deactivation - prepare the ship for return to
RRF in a ready status.
Phase 3 - Active Retention in the Ready Reserve Status -
work performed to maintain ships in the ready
status.
Phase 4 - Activation for Service - final activation to
make ships fully operational. [Ref. 4: p. 43]
The Navy transferred $5.2 million to MARAD to commence the
upgrade program at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1977.
Before the 30 ships could be upgraded, MARAD had
acquired newer, larger, and faster commercial ships. Five
C-3 breakbulk ships,- built in the early 1960's were traded
into the NDRF in 1977. The fallowing year, three Mariner
class breakbulk vessels were added to the fleet. It was
decided that these would be better ships to have in the
RRF. In late 1978, the RRF consisted of the five C-3 class
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breakbulk vessels, one intermodal ship, and one Victory-
ship. Additionally, plans called for upgrading eight
Seatrain-type ships and 14 Mariner class ships through
1980. The total of RRF would then be 29 ships CRef. 7: p.
43 .
The RRF has grown considerably since 1980. As of July
1987, there were 85 ships in the RRF and an additional 21
ships were being processed for RRF status. Originally, the
ships were located at the three NDRF locations: James
River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and Suisun Bay,
California. Now, they are located at various ports
throughout the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts and even
in Hawaii and Japan. An additional readiness status of 20
days has also been added for a small number of ships.
Originally, only breakbulk ships were planned for the RRF.
As new reqviiren>eritB have been uncovered, roll-om/roll-of 1
ships, barge carriers, heavy lift crane ships, and tankers
have been added to the fleet. Appendix A lists the ships
currently in the RRF.
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III. THE READY RESERVE FORCE TODAY
A. INTRODUCTION
With the exception of a tremendous increase in size,
few changes have occurred in the RRF since its inception in
1977. The RRF continues to be a Joint effort between the
Navy and the Maritime Administration to provide cargo ships
for use in a contingency within a 5, 10 and 20 day period.
The Navy funds the entire RRF program and is responsible
for ship acquistions and operations. MARAD is provided
funds for ship maintenance and preservation and the
establishment of General Agency Agreements.
This chapter will describe the RRF today: what ship
types are in the RRF, how these ships are acquired, where
the ships are located and what are their physical
conditions, how they are activated, how parts support is
provided, and how manning for these ships is achieved.
B. MISSION OF THE RRF SHIPS
The RRF is comprised of only those ships that provide
the highest degree of military usefulness. In periods of
mobilization, these ships provide support to deployed
military forces. The RRF is activated and mobilized when
the demand for sealift assets becomes greater than Military
Sealift Command (MSC) capabilities. These ships supply
21
support capabilities to the deployed military forces
through surge, resupply, and Mobile Logistics Support Force
(MLSF) support.
Although the mission is the same for all ships of the
RRF, fulfillment of the mission varies with the type of
ship. The majority of ships in the RRF are dry cargo
ships. The following are the types of RRF ships and a
description of their assignments;
1. Roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) - When used in conjunction
with surge shipping, RO/RO ships are used for the
initial movement of oversized combat equipment.
They have the distinct advantage of fast turnaround
as moving vehicles can be driven down their ramps.
They normally require a developed port to discharge
their cargo; however the Navy has developed a system
for use in low seas that enables vehicles to be
driven onto lighterage.
2. Lighter Aboard Ship CLASH) - LASH ships are used in
sustaining military supplies or carrying unit
equipment. They can carry lighterage on deck and up
to 89 500-ton capacity barges which are hoisted
aboard at the stern by a gantry crane.
3. SEABEE ships - These ships are also used in
sustaining military supplies or carrying unit
equipment. SEABEE ships carry 38 1,000-ton capacity
barges which are loaded by a stern elevator.
4. Breakbulk - These ships are used for resupply
operations. They are labor intensive and have long
load and off-load times. The advantage of breakbulk
ships is their self -sustainabi lity, the ability to
discharge cargo offshore by use of ships' booms and
cranes. They are also capable of handling most
military cargoes.
5. Auxiliary Crane Ship CTACS) - These ships give non-
self-sustaining ships such as container ships the
capability of off-loading in a forward area. They
too may be used during surge shipping. The TAGS are
modified container ships outfitted with marine heavy-
lift cranes. They are capable of off-loading wheeled
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or tracked vehicles (including the M-1 tank) and
lighters up to 110 tons [Ref. l:p. 263. When
equipped with the Navy's Sealift Enhancement Features
(SEF) , consisting of sea sheds or flat racks, the
TAGS is able to carry a large amount of cargo.
6. Tankers - Their primary mission is to support the
MLSF and their secondary mission is to support the
forward deployed combattants [Ref. l:p. 431. Some
tankers have been equipped with alongside refueling
rigs.
7. Troop ship - There is only one troop ship and it will
be used to deliver augmenting troops to the forward
theater
.
C. ACQUISITION OF SHIPS
The ships for the RRF are acquired from three sources:
upgrading ships from the NDRF, ships retired from the
Military Sealift Command (MSC), and direct procurement from
commercial sources. Originally, the RRF was required to
provide a 340,000 dead weight ton (DVT) capacity with 30
Victory ships. As more modern ships joined the NDRF, some
of these ships were added to the RRF. Based on the current
Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the size of the RRF should
be 120 ships by 1992. The ultimate goal for the RRF is 136
ships, 100 of which are dry cargo ships and 36 of which are
tankers. [Ref. 8]
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issues a planning
guidance on a yearly basis. This guidance dictates which
ship types will take priority for addition to the RRF
during that year.
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Ships from the NDRF and the retired MSC fleet are
selected for inclusion in the RRF based upon the same
criteria. The ship type must be included as a priority
from the CNO' s planning guidance. A source selection
committee examines the ship's characteristics (speed,
draft, dead weight tonnage, etc. ) to ensure eligibility
into the RRF. Additionally, the ship should be in good
physical condition. Upgrade costs along with available
Operations and Maintenance cO&M) funds, also impact upon
whether a ship will be upgraded to the RRF or remain in the
NDRF.
Ships may be acquired from commercial sources by two
different processes. First, a shipping company may turn
over to MLARAD a no longer commercially-viable, but
militarily useful ship. As a payment, the company will
then receive an equivalent tonnage of no longer useful NDRF
ships for scrap purposes. [Ref. 8]
The second process is through contract purchases. The
MSC contracting office will issue a Request for Proposal,
indicating the types of ships desired according to the
priority list. The source selection committee reviews the
bids received and determines the ships' eligibility for RRF
inclusion. Eligibility is based on the ship's
characteristics and physical condition. The final
selection is based on the priority list and the types of
ships currently available in the market place. Funding for
24
the future purchase of commercial vessels for the RRF is
contained in Table 2.
TABLE 2












Source: Ref . 8
D. LOCATION AND CONDITION OF SHIPS
Three regional locations are used for the RRF: the
Eastern Region (James River) where 35 ships are assigned;
the Gulf Region (Beaumont) where 29 ships are assigned; and
the Western Region (Suisun Bay) where 31 ships are
assigned. Although all ships are assigned to a region,
they are not all physically present at that location. The
majority of RRF ships in five day readiness status are
located at outports. These ships are pierside in a stand-
by status in different harbors throughout the country. Two
ships are located in Japan, and one is located in Hawaii.
A listing of ships by location and readiness status is in
Appendix A. The purpose of outporting the majority of the
RRF ships is to enhance and speed up the mobilization
process. By dispersing these ships through the country in
the time of activation, no shipyards are over-taxed in any
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geographical area. Outporting also lessens the problem of
manning these ships, as each outport location has a hiring
hail from which crews may be drawn.
The age and condition of the ships in the RRF vary.
The oldest ships were built in 1944, and the newest was
built in 1979. The older ships, although physically in
good condition, have antiquated equipment and systems
design. An example of this is the electrical systems on
the Victory and Seatrain ships. The shipboard electrical
systems are direct current and require motor generator sets
to provide alternating current to operate the newer
electronic equipment. The newest ships, by far the most
modern, are foreign-built and present a problem when
manning is required due to their complex engineering design
[Ref. 9: p. 23. The median age of a RRF ship is about 23
years.
E. ACTIVATION HISTORY
From the origin of the RRF in 1977 through February
1987, 35 RRF ships have been activated. Of these 20 have
been "no-notice", with the remaining 15 being "service"
activations. A "no-notice" activation is initiated by a
telephone call from the Navy to MARAD requesting the
activation of a specific ship. These are test activations
without any prior planning. A "service" activation is a
planned activation where the ship is either needed for its
26
services or as part of a test or exercise. Two of the
"service" activations, both involving Victory ships, were
not initiated by the Navy. One ship was activated with a
request from Congress; the other ship was activated for
shipyard and general agent training [Ref. 10: p. 231.
In all but one case, the activations were completed
within the expected timeframe. The one case was the result
of a major boiler failure and the activation was stopped to
allow for repairs. No other maintenance problems were
encountered with the activations. The activations and
mobilization of these ships lasted from one day to 179
continuous days, thus proving the reliability of these
ships. [Ref. 10:p. 24]
In January of 1985, an activation and break-out of
multiple ships from a single port was ordered. This was the
first and only multiple ship break-out and it did not prove
to be a total success. The three vessels activated were
from the Suisun Bay Reserve Fleet outported in the port of
San Francisco. It was one of these ships that developed
the boiler problem during sea trials and required repairs
[Ref. 10: p. 243. Appendix B is a summary of all
activations. Appendix C is the current activation plan.
F. PARTS SUPPORT
There are two types of spare parts inventories in
support of the RRF vessels. The first is the on board
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spare parts Inventory with which the ship is equipped.
These spares are normally purchased with the ship. This
inventory should closely follow the Builder's Allowance
List (BAD. The second is the shore-based spare parts
inventory. As of January 1986, MARAD maintained a shore-
based inventory for RRF use valued at over $8.9 million.
This inventory is warehoused at the three reserve fleet
locations and at various off-site locations. The purpose
of maintaining these inventories is to support the
activation of the ship and provide spare parts support for
sustained operations up to 180 days CRef. 11; p. 28].
As of June 1986, MARAD has spent over SI. 3 million to
conduct a physical inventory on forty RRF ships. The
Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed an audit of
MARAD' s management and control of spare parts for the RRF
on 14 April 1987. The results of this audit are as
follows:
MARAD needs to improve its management, control, and
accountability of shore-based spare parts as well as
those parts stored onboard RRF vessels. MARAD has
accumulated over S8.9 million of shore-based spare parts
without effectively managing or controlling their
accountability, purchase, or use. Inventory records are
incomplete and inaccurate, and spare parts are acquired
without demonstrated need, inspection, or plan for their
use. Although accumlated to support vessel activations
and operations, no shore-based spare parts exist for
almost one-half of RRF vessels, exist in excessive
quantities, and may never be used. MARAD personnel also
do not effectively control and account fo inventories of
onboard spare parts. For the vessels we visited,
significant variances existed between spare parts on hand
and the inventory records, parts are not adequately
labeled or identified, and security is insufficient to
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preserve inventory integrity or safeguard against
unauthorized use. On the average, 19 percent of the line
items tested resulted in parts overages or shortages. Ve
estimated that complete physical inventories on these
vessels would identify lost accountability for parts
totaling more than S660,000. Extrapolating these results
to the entire fleet of 72 vessels indicates the potential
for lost spare parts accountabi Ity amounting to S2.5
million. Also, MARAD has spent over SI. 3 million to
conduct and record physical inventories which are no
longer valid and provide minimal benefits to parts
accessibility and equipment repairs in time of need.
[Ref. ll:p. 2]
In June 1987, a Joint Working Group was established
between MSC and MARAD for the purpose of spare parts
management of the RRF. In July 1987, a Plan of Action and
Milestone (POA&M) was approved by both MSC and MARAD for
completion of inventory and validation of shore and ship-
board spare parts. A Ships' Allowance List (SAL) will be
developed for all RRF ships. This will be a modified
version of the Builder's Allowance List [Ref. 12:
Attachment 3] .
Spare parts are acquired by MARAD through cash
purchases, procurements in conjuction with MSC vessel
purchase, and transfers from MSC. MARAD has made 12 cash
purchases for a total of S7.5 million, of which $4.2
million occurred during the period of June 1983 through
October 1985. These parts were purchased without
inspection or a demonstrated benefit of need [Ref. 11: p.
6]
.
MARAD' s justification for these purchases is based on
the age of the RRF ships and the diminishing commercial
availabilty of these parts.
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G. MANNING PROCEDURES
KARAD awards General Agency Agreements (GAA) for the
operation and maintenance of RRF ships according to a
competitive procurement process. Duties of the General
Agent include the following:
1. Procure the ship's Master, subject to the National
Shipping Authority's approval, as an agent and
employee of the U.S. government.
2. Procure and make available to the Master, for
engagement by him, the officers and crew required.
3. Equip, victual, supply, and repair the vessel.
4. Develop activation specifications in coordination
with the MARAD Cognizant Regional Director (CRD) and
Ship Operations Officer (SOO)
.
5. Hire tugboats and pilots and pay canal tolls.
6. Appoint part agents at all ports for husbanding the
ship.
7. Relay voyage instructions directly to the Master, as
may be required.
8. Assist, as required, in obtaining all appropriate and
applicable certification and documentation for the
ship, all necessary shipping documents, and all
necessary port and harbor information. CRef. 13: p. 10-
1]
Upon notice of a requirement to activate a ship, MARAD
notifies by telephone its regional and field offices,
General Agents, seafaring unions headquarters. Reserve
Fleet sites, and inspection entities. The regional
offices coordinate actions with the General Agent. The
specific unions for which the General Agent has manning
agreements are also notified by MARAD--first by
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telephone, then by telex. The telex to the union names
the ship to be manned, the ship's location, the General
Agent, and available information on the voyage. [Ref.
13: p. 12-1],
According to the GAA, General Agents are responsible
for the crewing of the ships. The General Agents also
telephone the unions with crewing requirements. The
unions then contact individuals to fill the billets on
each ship. Contact may be via telephone or through the
use of call boards in hiring halls. The unions have
agreed "to give priority to personnel with prior
experience aboard the RRF ships (or ships of the same
design), to the extent they can be identified and are
available" [Ref. 13: p. 12-2]. To ensure a timely arrival,
the unions will also assist the individual with travel
arrangements, if necessary. If air travel priorities are
required, KARAD will request authorization from the
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
.
There is one exception to union manning of the RRF
ships. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) may opt to man
ex-USNS ships with civilian mariners [Ref. 13: p. 2-23. If
this happens, operational control for the vessel will be
transferred to MSC. MSC will then be responsible for the
ship as if it were the General Agent.
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IV. MANNING THE READY RESERVE FORCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The men and women merchant mariners sailing on U.S.
flag ships will be called upon to man the RRF ships upon
their activations. The RRF ships are labor-intensive, with
each ship averaging 40 seamen. Should the entire RRF of
136 ships be activated, approximately an additional 5,440
billets must be filled. Concurrently, U.S. flag ships will
continue to operate, thereby competing for the actively
sailing merchant mariners.
An important concept to understand with respect to the
manning of billets is that of the seafarers per billet
ratio. A seafarer does not sail on a ship for 365 days per
year. The seafarer must be given time off for illness,
vacations, personal business, etc. Therefore, each billet
will require more than one seafarer to fill that position.
An industry standard is to assume two seafarers per
billet. However, during a contingency when manning levels
and available billets increase, the ratio decreases. Any
ratio lower than 1.5 seafarers per billet is considered to
result in a shortage of manpower.
The ships in the RRF tend to be old, some dating back
to the 1940' s and 1950' s. These ship have not been
enhanced with the new technological advances and,
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therefore, require more seafarers for manning purposes.
Additionally, some of these ships will require extra
manpower to perform their missions as Naval auxiliaries.
Many of the mariners who will man the RRF ships may require
special training. An example will be the seamen required
to operate the ships' booms and winches— a job which is
almost a lost art in the modern seafaring world. Another
area of concern is a possible lack of steamship engineers
as the current trend turns towards diesel motorships. Due
to the decline in the number of merchant mariners and the
special manning requirements for the RRF ships, recent
studies indicate a shortage of mariners should the RRF be
fully activated. This chapter shall examine the current
status of the merchant marine, the decline in merchant
mariners, the recent manpower studies, and possible
solutions to the manpower shortage.
B. THE MERCHANT MARINE TODAY
During 1986, a total of 28, 120 seamen shipped out on
U.S. flag vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over and received
a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) discharge slip. Of these seamen,
8,708 were 1 icensed of f icers filling the 3521 available
billets C2.47 seafarers per billet) and 12,649 unlicensed
personnel filling the 7180 available billets (1.76
seafarers per billet) [Ref. 14].
The merchant marine today is characterized by an older
population. The Navy Merchant Marine Manpower study dated
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July 1986 collected data on the age of the actively sailing
mariners. A large percentage of mariners are over 50 years
old with the exception of engineering officers. Table 3
describes the age status of mariners in 1984. It may be
anticipated in the next decade that many of these mariners
will retire and a large number of positions will be opening
for new mariners and for those trained mariners who have
been unable to find sea-going Jobs. One problem which may
result from the new mariners is the lack of experience,
particularly in the operation of the RRF steam ships and
self-sustaining ships.
TABLE 3
AGES OF MERCHANT MARINERS (as of 1984)
Median Percentage of Workforce
Skill CateRory Age 59 years or older
Deck Officers 48.5 32.6%
Deck Unlicensed 55.6 36.7%
Engineering Officers 44.4 28.0%
Engineering Unlicensed 55.4 36.6%
Radio Officers 60.6 56.1%
Steward Department 57.1 42.1%
Source: Navy Merchant Marine Manpower Study, p. 8
The future for merchant mariners does not look bright.
Year after year, the number of U.S. flag vessels is also
decreasing along with the number of billets for seamen.
Between June 30, 1966 and September 30, 1986, the U.S. Flag
fleet declined 61.6%, from 1,019 ships to 391 ships
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CRef. 15: p. 98; Ref. 16: p. 9]. It is also harder for new
entrants to find Jobs in the industry. Only 25% of the 219
graduatess of the Merchant Marine Academy in June 1987 have
received sailing positions CRef. 17: p. 37],
C. THE DECLINE IN MERCHANT MARINERS
As shipboard operations have been enhanced by new
technology and as the number of U.S. flag ships has
decreased, the merchant mariner has been plagued by a
substantial reduction in available sea-going billets. A
desire to reduce operating costs has also negatively
impacted the number of billets. Many mariners have taken
jobs ashore, sometimes outside of the maritime industry.
A number of factors influence the number of actively
sailing merchant mariners. First, the number of active
merchant mariners is based on the number of active ships
and billets in the U.S. flag fleet. Ship characteristics
also affect the number of merchant mariners by increasing
or decreasing the number of shipboard billets. Newer ships
with high technology equipment will usually require fewer
seamen than older ships. The type of service a ship
performs also impacts the crew size. A self-sustaining
ship, which can load and offload its own cargo, requires
more personnel than a container ship which utilizes shore
cranes for cargo handling.
Manning costs are a major operating expense for
operators of U.S. flag ships. In an effort to be
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competitive with other countries' flag fleets, operating
costs must be reduced. Reductions in manning have been
emphasized in recent years. This reduction is possible as
technology changes, services onboard ships are reduced, and
shoreside assistance increases.
Ita j or technological changes have occurred in the
engineering spaces. Of particular note are the innovations
of remote control of main propulsion machinery from the
bridge and an alarmed remote sensor to monitor engine
operating conditions. This new technology has eliminated
the requirement for a 24-hour watch. Only a minimum number
of engineering personnel are required to operate such an
engine room LRef. 18; p. 31].
The advances in maintenance and repair have also
resulted in a reduction in manning requirements. Epoxy
paints and special coatings have reduced required deck
maintenance work. Automatic monitoring devices detect
malfunctions and advise which modular units need to be
replaced. Potential problems can also be identified by
condition monitoring systems, thus allowing repairs to be
performed before the situation becomes critical
[Ref . 18: p. 32]
.
The steward' s department has also been the target for
manning reductions. The traditional meal service by
stewards is being replaced by a cafeteria-style mess on
many ships. Personnel within the steward's department are
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now performing additional functions. A cook may also be a
baker. A utilityman may also work as an assistant cook.
An important function now being performed ashore is the
formulation of cargo stowage plans with the use of
computers. This relieves the burden which had previously
belonged to the master and chief mate and thereby frees
them to take care of other business. Having been relieved
of these cargo responsibilities, the chief mate has
replaced another deck officer standing deck watches on some
ships.
These changes have reduced the number of billets
available for merchant mariners. Using the traditional two
seamen per billet ratio, each elimination of a billet takes
away a job from two seamen. As smaller ships are being
replaced by larger ships, many billets are disappearing.
An example given by a MARAD employee illustrates this
situation. Four older containerships with a combined crew
of 160 workers could be replaced by a single containership
with a crew of less than 25 people [Ref. 19; p. 6C] . Using
the ratio, this would take jobs away from at least 270
seamen. Another example is the Japanese ' Pioneer Ship' .
In the fall of 1987, the Japanese will begin an experiment
with eleven man crews on ocean-going containerships, bulk
carriers, and car carriers. The purpose of this experiment
is to "study both the technical changes necessary for the
small crews and the training required to fit crews for this
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type of operation" [Ref. 20: p. 8]. In an effort to reduce
crew size even more, the Swedish Shipowners Association has
authorized a study to be performed to examine the
feasibility of eight-man crews. Specifically, the study
will examine "minimum manning requirements, technological
necessities and the division of tasks between shore and sea
staffs on three types of vessels: liners, tankers and dry
cargo carriers" CRef. 21: p. 74]. Upon completion of the
written study in early 1988, sea trials will be conducted
to test the study results.
D. MANNING REQUIREMENTS
Minimum manning requirements are contained in Title 46,
Part 157 of the Code of Federal ReRulations (CFR) . Two
sections are of importance in establishing manning
policies. First, 46 CFR 157.20-5(a) established the
division into a minimum of three watches for licensed
officers, sailors, coal passers, firemen, oilers, and water
tenders and 46 CFR 157.20-10 states that no licensed
officer or seaman in the deck or engine department of a
vessel shall be required to be on duty for more than eight
hours in any one day except under extraordinary
circumetances. 46 CFR 157 also requires the following
minimum manning requirements:
1. One master for all oceangoing and coastwise vessels
2. Three mates for vessels over 1000 gross tons
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3. One licensed chief engineer on every steam propelled
vessel and seagoing mechanically propelled vessels
of greater than 200 gross tons
4. At least 65% of the deck crew, exclusive of licensed
officers, shall be rated as able seamen
The actual minimum manning requirements for each vessel are
established by the U.S. Coast Guard's Of f icer- in-Charge
,
Marine Inspections at the time of the vessel's inspection.
The guidelines of 46 CFR 157 must be adhered to by the
inspector. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for
enforcing U.S. manning requirements on U.S. flag ships.
E. MERCHANT MARINER MANPOWER STUDIES
Since 1984, three different studies have been conducted
to assess the ability of the merchant marine to man reserve
ships in a time of crisis/mobilization. Each study will be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
1
. Maritime Administration
In 1984, MARAD published a manning study entitled
"Reserve Fleet Crewing Feasibility 1984-1995" [Ref. 221.
The study concentrated on the ratio of seamen ashore per
sea-going billet, since it is these seamen who will man the
reserve ships. At the time of the study, there were 2.5
active seamen per billet which implies that 1.5 seamen per
billet are ashore at any given time.
The study projected the number of active ships and
billets from 1984 through 1995. The number of seamen was
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calculated for each year based on a seamen per billet
ratio.
The study's conclusions were that "in terms of
gross work force totals, the active peacetime seafaring
work force will be adequate in mobilization to fully crew
all RRF and Military Sealift Command (MSC) Reduced
Operating Status CROS) ships as well as the privately- owned
fleet and the active civilian-manned government-owned
fleet" [Ref. 22: p. 103. Table 4 enumerates the study's
results from a worst case analysis, assuming only two
seamen per pre-mobi 1 izat ion billet. The numbers represent
the predicted 1992 ratios of seamen ashore per billet
during an RRF and ROS mobilization; therefore, any number
greater than one implies no shortage.
TABLE 4
MARAD PROJECTED 1992 SEAMEN ASHORE/BILLET RATIOS







A major drawback of this study is that only gross
numbers are used. For example, engineering personnel have
not been divided into experience groups such as steam








determine if a shortage of steam qualified personnel may be
experienced.
2 . Transportation Institute
In October 1986, the Transportation Institute
published a study entitled "America's Vanishing Merchant
Mariners; Diagnosis, Prognosis and Prescriptions for a
Strong Defense" [Ref. 233. Although calculations were not
provided, this study estimated the following personnel
shortages for surge shipping operations for 1986 and 1992.
The study assumed that, at any given time, only a
percentage of the non-sailing mariners would be available.
1986: approximately 2,000 seamen based on 90%
availability of mariners
approximately 6,000 seamen based on 75%
availability of mariners
1992: between 9,000 and 10,000 seamen based on 95%
availability of mariners
approximately 15,000 seamen based on 75%
availability of mariners [Ref. 23: pp. 14, 15]
3. U.S. Navy
The Strategic Seal if t Division of the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issued a study on Merchant
Marine Manpower in July 1986 [Ref. 24]. This study is the
most comprehensive of the three studies. Each category of
crew is examined separately.
The study estimated the manpower available for 1992
using the seamen per billet ratio of 1986. Based on 100%
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availability of mariners and peacetime billet requirements,
separate ratios were calculated for deck officers,
unlicensed deck hands, steam-experienced engineering
officers, diesel-exper ienced engineering officers,
unlicensed engineroom personnel with steam experience,
unlicensed engineroom personnel with diesel experience,
radio officers, and steward's department personnel. The
ratios ranged from a high of 2.25 for diesel-exper ienced
engineering officers to a low of 1.78 for the steward's
department personnel.
The study assumed that, at any given time, only 90%
of the merchant mariners would be available for service.
The mobilization billet requirements for 1992 are based on
356 U.S. flag vessels, 20 percent of the remaining
Effective U.S. Controlled ships' billets, 149 surge ships
(137 RRF, 2 hospital ships, 2 aviation logistics support
ships, 8 Fast Sealift Support ships), 29 preposit ioned
ships, and 50 common-user ships under charter to MSC.
The study assumed any seamen per billet ratio less
than 1.5 would be unacceptable. "The 1.5 to 1.0 ration was
considered to be only marginally adequate from a wartime
planners viewpoint. ...'Ultimately, there is also a full
mobilization point beyond which the work force cannot be
expected to sustain operations effectively without some
type of augmentation or relief.'" CRef. 24: p. 4]
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The study results indicated that shortfalls could
be expected in every department with the exception of
diesel-trained engineering officers. The largest shortages
will occur among unlicensed deck hands and unlicensed
engineering personnel trained for steam engines. Large
shortages are also estimated for the steward's department.
Table 5 summarizes the results of the study. The shortages
were calculated as follows: first, multiply the manpower
requirement by a 1.5 seamen per billet ratio, then subtract
that number from the number of available mariners.
TABLE 5















(90%) Req ' mt fall (90%) Req' mt fall
4,270 2,969 184 3,882 3, 118 795
8, 171 6,393 1,418 7,387 7,372 3,671
3,367 2,410 248 2,653 2,235 699
1,388 891 1,748 1, 158
3,535 2,995 957 2,869 2,890 1,466
1, 199 771 1,428 1,008 84
828 588 54 766 588 116
4,821 3,611 595 4,359 3,769 1,295
TOTAL 27,579 20,628 3,456 25,092 22,138 8,126
Source: Navy Merchant Marine Manpower Study, p. iv
F. MANNING CONCEPTS
If the above shortfalls for 1992 have been accurately
predicted, how can manning be provided for the ships?
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There are four manning concepts currently under review by
ItARAD and the Navy. These are
1. Enhance the status quo
2. Expand the Merchant Marine Reserve
3. Utilize Naval Reserve units
4. Maintain a larger, active U.S. Flag Fleet [Ref. 24:
p. iii]
The following paragraphs will describe and analyze each of
these concepts. Additionally, the concept of manning Navy
auxiliary ships with merchant mariners will be examined as
a means of increasing the pool of mariners.
1
. Enhance the Status Quo
This alternative places total responsibility on the
General Agent and the unions to man the RRF ships upon
request by MARAD. The current GAAs do not require
contingency manning plans. This alternative would expand
the General Agent's contractual obligation to 1) "include
specific contingency manning plans in their proposals to
operate surge shipping, and 2) maintain a list of
additional civilian merchant mariners who could be called
upon to man subsequent merchant requirements as they become
operative" [Ref. 25: End. 11. The operating contracts
would state the size of the crews and any special
qualifications and training requirements. This alternative
would be available in non-mobilization as well as
mobilization contingencies.
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This alternative appears to be an easy, workable
solution to the manning problem and its implementation
could be immediate. A major advantage of this alternative
is the ability to provide manning in both mobilization and
non-mobi 1 izat ion contingencies. Costs associated with this
alternative would be minimal. The costs would be included
in the fixed price contract and paid by the Navy. The
major disadvantage is that with the predicted shortfall, a
time will come when the General Agent will be unable to
provide the manning as required by the contract. What will
happen under those circumstances if the government has not
developed an additional source for manning? Another
problem might be the ratings of available crew members.
For example, a licensed engineer for diesel ships cannot be
expected to fill a billet on a gas turbine or steam ship.
This alternative is feasible only as a short-term solution.
2
. Expand the Merchant Marine Reserve
Before discussing the expansion of the Merchant
Marine Reserve program, it is important to understand the
current program—how it is organized and what its mission
is. The mission of the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve
program is
to establish and maintain in the U.S. Merchant Marine an
organization of seagoing personnel trained in Naval
organization, administration, and operational procedures
to insure that effective interface and coordination are
maintained with U.S. Naval forces in time of peace,
national emergency, or war. [Ref. 26: p. 31]
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The program consists of two elements: the Merchant Marine
Individual Ready Reserve Group (MMIRRG) and the Merchant
Marine Reserve Operational Command Headquarters (MMROCH)
units.
Only licensed merchant marine officers, who are
currently engaged in the maritime industry, are eligible
for the MMIRRG. The primary source for these officers is
graduates of the Merchant Marine Academy and the five state
maritime academies. These graduates, under the Training
and Service Agreement, are obligated to Join the U.S.
Merchant Marine Naval Reserve for six years and to perform
one of the following: 1) sail on a U.S. flag vessel for
four months every two years and perform two weeks active
duty for training each year or 2) serve on active duty in
the Navy or Coast Guard for three years [Ref. 27: p. 3].
MMIRRG officers serving on a U.S. flag vessel will not be
mobilized unless there is an urgent requirement for their
services. Those officers employed ashore may be mobilized
on a case-by-case basis. Table 6 describes the composition
of the MMIRRG program as of April 1987.
Eligibility for the MMROCH is extended to any Naval
reservist with an IIXX designator and prior maritime
related experience. These officers will mobilize to MARAD
headquarters and regional offices to ensure effective
liaison between the Navy and MARAD in the utilization of
merchant shipping and civilian seagoing personnel.
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TABLE 6
MERCHANT MARINE NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS BY LICENSE AND AGE
(as of April 1987)
Arg Master C/M 2/M 3/M C/E 1/E 2/E 3/E R
21-25 4 125 10 1 108
26-30 16 30 87 237 13 31 85 229
31-35 52 47 32 20 15 25 29 36
36-40 48 3 474222
41-45 20210152010
46-50 14 2 0003
51-55 14 0001 1
56-60 13 6 1
TOTALS 177 84 127 386 59 62 117 376 7
NOTE 1: Total number of reservists is 3,090. An
additional 1,695 officers do not have license
information on file.
NOTE 2; 2,618 officers are members of the Ready Reserve
472 officers are members of the Standby Reserve
Source: Chief of Naval Reserve, Code 3113
The alternative of expanding the Merchant Marine
Reserve program will actually result in the creation of a
new civilian Merchant Marine Reserve program. The Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 authorizes the creation of such an
organization by the Secretary of Transportation. Both
licensed and unlicensed mariners will be allowed to join
this program. Inactive mariners (those not sailing, but
previously qualified) will also be eligible. The mission
of this new reserve program would be to provide manning for
shipping assets when General Agents are unable to provide
manning through their normal procedures. Members of the
Civilian Merchant Marine Reserve program would provide
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short-notice manning for ships. Each mariner would sign an
agreement "to respond to calls for manning of merchant
shipping in both mobilization and non-mobilization
contingencies" [Ref. 25: End. 1]. Although there might be
a slight time delay in manning the ships (the General
Agents must first try to find personnel and then notify
MARAD of their inability to provide a crew), this
alternative would guarantee personnel to man the ships.
On the surface, this program appears feasible.
There are many trained mariners who have been unable to
find sea-going Jobs and have since found shore-side
employment. However, their skills can be questioned after
not having sailed for a number of years. Can we entrust a
ship to someone who has not sailed in 15-20 years or more?
Will the Coast Guard provide waivers for officers to sail
on expired licenses? How will the maritime industry view
the concept? Will actively sailing mariners feel their
jobs threatened by these reservists? Nonetheless, one
advantage of the older mariners is their familiarity with
the older breakbulk ships in the RRF. A newly graduated
third assistant engineer may only have experience on diesel
engines, while the older mariner is steamship-qualified.
Another advantage is the ability to mobilize these
reservists during non-mobi 1 izat ion situations.
The cost of establishing the new reserve program
may be the biggest stumbling block. It is estimated that
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start-up costs for the first year would be $190 million and
S45.9 million for every year thereafter [Ref. 28].
3 . Utilize Naval Reserve Units
This alternative would establish Naval Reserve
units, whose mission would be to man the surge shipping
ships. Reservists considered for these billets would come
from the Selected Reserve (SELRES) and from the Individual
Ready Reserve (IRR). Another source for manning would be
retirees who are members of the Fleet Reserve. These
individuals would be available during mobilization, but not
necessarily during a non-mobilization situation.
To utilize the reservist in a non-mobilization
situation would "require voluntary execution of special
agreements beyond existing statutory Naval Reserve
obligations" [Ref. 24: p. 26]. This is a major
disadvantage. Another problem with this option is the
limited size of the Naval Reserve program. To allow for
personnel growth in the reserve program, Congressional
approval is required. At a cost of S46 million per year
paid by the Navy, approval is questionable if other less
costly means are available [Ref. 24: p. 26]. If approval
were not granted, the question must be asked if the Chief
of Naval Reserves would be willing to transfer a number of
his people to these units. These reservists must have sea-
going slcills. Therefore, the gain to the Merchant Marine
units would be a loss to the Naval Surface units. How
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would these reservists be trained? How would they be
chosen for the program? Would the officers be required to
have Coast Guard licenses? Or would that requirement be
waived? Another problem is the status of the merchant
ship. Once that ship is manned by military personnel, its
status would change to that of a warship under
international law. Although this would have little impact
during mobilization, it is questionable if such a status
would be beneficial during pre-mobi 1 izat ion and non-
mobilization contingencies.
4. Xaintain a Larger, Active U.S. Flag Fleet
This alternative looks at increasing the size of
the U.S. flag fleet as a means of arresting the decline in
the size of merchant marine labor force. If ships are not
available, men and women will not enter the sea-going
community. This alternative is dependent on the increase
in the number of ships which will happen only as a result
of an increase in cargo for carriage. According to R. V.
Kesteloot, "cargo begets ships that beget seafarers"
[Ref . 29: p. 3]
.
This alternative is preferred from the perspective
of utilizing a pool of trained, actively sailing mariners
to man the RRF ships. There would be little doubt as to
the capabilities and qualifications of these individuals.
The personnel build-up would be easily accomplished. There
are currently many mariners who have found shoreside
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employment because they were unable to get a sea-going
billet. It may be assumed that a number of these mariners
would accept a sea-going billet. Additionally, there is an
annual influx of officers who are graduates from the
xoaritime academies.
The major problem to be solved is how to get
sufficient cargo to warrant an increase in shipping
assets. How can the U.S. maritime industry become a viable
competitor in the shipping business? Government support in
the form of subsidies, the Operating Differential Subsidies
(ODS) and the Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS),
are almost non-existent today. No funds for CDS have been
appropriated by the Congress since Fiscal Year 1981.
Eighty-eight of the 372 ocean-going vessels in March 1987
were receiving ODS [Ref. 30]. In April 1987, maritime
union leaders presented testimony before the President's
Commission on the Merchant Marine and Defense. An overall
concensus was that "cargo, specifically more cargo for U.S.
flag vessels, is the key to rejuvenating this country's
merchant marine" CRef. 31]. Mr. Talmage Simpkins,
executive director of the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee "urged
adoption of a national cargo policy as the 'most effective
and direct way of restoring an American-flag merchant
marine'" [Ref. 31]. He also recommended the following:
1. Bilateral liner and bulk cargo pacts.
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2. Trade agreements that reserve cargoes in the liner
trades.
3. Stepped-up enforcement of cargo preference laws.
4. An end to foreign registration of U. S. -owned ships
to avoid this country's taxes, labor laws and other
requirements, and a halt to Defense Department
reliance on such vessels.
5. An import tax on all bulk cargoes brought in by
foreign-flag carriers.
6. Tougher enforcement of domestic trade restrictions
especially as they affect foreign-flag cruise
vessels [Ref. 31: p. ?]
.
Any of the first four recommendations would provide
additional cargo for carriage.
An added benefit to the increase in the number of
merchant mariners is the increase in available shipping
assets to be used in a contingency. If more militarily-
useful commercial ships are available, a fewer number of
RRF ships will need to be activated and thus a smaller pool
of merchant mariners will be required. If fewer RRF ships
need to be maintained, the cost savings could be used to
help offset the costs encountered with bilateral agreements
and cargo preference laws.
5. Manning Naval Auxiliary Ships with Merchant
Mariners
This alternative is examined as a means of
expanding the pool of actively sailing merchant mariners.
By manning Naval auxiliaries with merchant mariners, the
number of actively sailing merchant mariners will increase
due to the seafarers per seagoing billet ratio. During a
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contingency, the ratio decreases. Those mariners not
actively sailing on a Navy auxiliary or a commercial ship
could be called upon to man the RRF ships.
This alternative will definitely create more jobs for
merchant mariners. It will also enhance the abilities of
the merchant mariners who will man the ships in the RRF
which would be used as Naval auxiliaries. The concept of
manning auxiliaries with civilians was first tested between
February 7 and April 4, 1972. The SS Erna Elizabeth
performed the mission of a fleet oiler by the underway
refueling of some forty Navy ships. A second feasibility
test was performed in December 1972. The SS Lash Italia
delivered lighters to an on-station fleet stores ship of
the Sixth Fleet. Both tests were considered successful by
the Navy [Ref. 32:p. 423. Currently, civilian mariners of
the Military Sealift Command man approximately 30 Naval
auxiliaries from fleet oilers to combat stores ships to
ammunition ships to fleet tugs. These civilian mariner-
manned ships have continuously performed well. Merchant
mariner-manned auxiliaries could be expected to perform
equally as well. The contract for the merchant manning of
Navy auxiliaries would have to include certain elements to
make this alternative feasible:
1. Unions would have to guarantee no strikes and
provide flexibility in application of current work
rules.
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2. A dedicated and trained civilian manpower pool would
have to be provided to ensure continuity and
availability of skilled manpower.
3. Special security requirements and procedures need to
be developed for civilian crews.
4. Augmented crews would be required to ensure crew
endurance and survivability in high-tempo conditions
[Ref . 33: p. 1-4] .
A military detachment such as those onboard the MSC
civilian mariner-manned auxiliaries could perform those
military-specific functions such as classified
communications and command and control. However, is the
Navy willing to turn over these ships to civilian control?
Vill the merchant mariners be able to perform well under
wartime conditions?
In 1977-1978, Information Spectrum, Inc. studied
the feasibility of civilian manning of Navy support ships
at the request of the Systems Analysis Division <0P-96) of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The study
examined the differences among military manning, Navy civil
service manning, and commercial contract manning of these
ships. Figure 1 lists the advantages and disadvantages of
each option. Although the Information Spectrum study did
not make any recommendations, it specifically did not state





Direct fleet chain of conmiand.
Largest crew for damage control/
survivabillty/product delivery.
Direct line of military command.
Provides command and training
billets.












Peacetime ship utilization higher.
Compatible with peacetime
mission of fleet.
- Reduced operational control.
- No defense capability.
- Lower survivability due to
- fewer on-board personnel.
- Loss of Navy command and
training billets.
- Potential endurance problems
during a war/contingency.




- Cost higher than Navy Civil
Service nanning.
- Least operational control.
- No defense capability.
- Lower survivability due to
fewer on-board personnel.
- Limited control over crew
selection.
- Loss of Navy command and
training billets.
- Minor contractual/legislative
problems needs to be overcome.
- Potential endurance problems
during a war/contingency.
- Eventual loss of most Navy
Military Manned fleet
support skills.
Source: Investigation of the Potential for Increased Use of Civilain
Manning in Fleet Support Ships, Volume 1, p. 20.
Cost lower than Navy Military
manning.
Releases military personnel to
combat roles.
Peacetime ship utilization higher.
Supports the private sector of
the economy.
Potential political support
from the private sector.
Compatible with peacetime
mission of fleet.
Figure 1 - Pros 2md Cons of Xannlng Altemativee
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G. CONCLUSION
The outlook for merchant mariners is bleak. Mariners
have been plagued with ship and billet reductions since the
end of World Var II. Technological advances as well as a
need to reduce operating costs has put the Job of the
merchant mariner in jeopardy. Although shortages will not
occur in peacetime, it is highly questionable whether
sufficient mariners will be available during a contingency
or full mobilization.
The ability of the RRF to perform its mission is based
on the availability of merchant mariners to man the ships.
For without trained and experienced mariners, these ships
are useless.
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V. SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the supply and logistic
support required before, during, and after the activation
of an RRF ship. An RRF ship requires support both onboard
and ashore in order for it to perform its required tasks.
Supply support consists of three elements: spares,
consumable and expendable stores, subsistence stores, and
bunker. Spare parts are replacement parts kept for the
purpose of repairing and maintaining the mechanical and
electrical equipment onboard ship. There are two types of
spare parts inventories maintained in support of the RRF,
the onboard spares and the shore-based spares.
Consumables are those articles required in the
operation of a ship in conjunction with the needs of its
crew. Consumable items are those articles which are
completely consumed after their initial use or are not fit
for reissue once used. Examples of consumables are paint,
grease, soap, paint brushes, mops and medicines.
Expendables are those articles used in day-to-day
maintenance and operation of the ship. Expendable items
gradually deteriorate but require replacement due to high
usage. Examples of expendables are hawsers, cables, hand
tools, shackles, and binoculars.
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Subsistence stores are the dry and frozen provisions
that are needed for the welfare of the officers and crew
while living onboard. Bunker is the fuel needed to operate
the main propulsion plant of the ship. In some cases,
bunker may also be additional fuel taken on-board to
replenish other ships.
The term "logistics support" is used in this chapter to
refer to the availability of the supplies and the means of
acquiring them. This support will include what is
available overseas and in the present supply system used by
the RRF.
Sealift Enhancement Features (SEP) are also included in
this chapter. Although the SEP program is not an integral
part of supply or logistic support, it is directly related
to both in the support of the RRP ships. Not all ships
which enter the NDRF and RRP are militarily useful. The
addition of sealift enhancement features changes the
profile of the cargo the ships can carry and their ability
to be replenished. The problems to be discussed are the
availability of the SEP to the RRP and the costs involved.
B. PARTS AND MAINTENANCE AVAILABILITY
The inadequacies of the onboard and shore-based spare
parts inventories maintained by MARAD was discussed in
Chapter III. To rectify this situation, KARAD has
installed a RRP-Management Information System (MIS) on
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their mainframe computer. Once the validation of the
inventory of repair parts is completed, this information
can be placed into the system and accessed by all concerned
[Ref . 34: p. 3]
.
The acquisition of spare parts, which have a demand
requirement but no stock on hand, was evaluated by Stanley
Associates in a study conducted for MARAD. The bottom line
of their findings was, if the ship and its equipment are
not part of the operating world environment, they are not
generating a consumption demand. This means that the parts
are not stocked in the commercial support sector. [Ref.
35:p. 3-9]
Spare parts for engineering are broken down into three
categories. The first is the category of parts which
generate a relatively high consumption demand such as
bearings, seals, and governor parts. Spare parts in this
category are usually stocked onhand and are readily
available from the manufacturer. The second category is
those parts which do not have a high enough demand or are
too costly to maintain a manufacturer's inventory. The
last category is those support parts which are manufactured
by a different company than the supplier of the equipment
they are used with. Parts which fall into categories two
or three can expect lead times ranging from 17 to 36 weeks.
[Ref. 35:p. 3-10]
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A study of merchant ship spare parts provisioning was
also conducted by Mystech Associates. The conclusion from
their report is as follows:
It has been confirmed that the principal owner
procurement problem is the long lead time necessary for
certain key items. This can be partially attributed to
the small portion of total business provided to most
manufacturers by the maritime industry as a whole. For
this reason, manufacturers will not interrupt industrial
or commercial production runs in order to produce a
single unit for a vessel. [Ref. 36]
Maintenance or shipyard support is more important than
supply support. The ships of the RRF have a very limited
time period in which to be activated. Supply support for
major equipment would be useless if the shipyards were not
available to facilitate repairs. A standard practice is to
outport RRF ships in close proximity to yards which are
able to meet demand requirements in case of a general
mobilization. The capabilities of 66 shipyards in a mass
mobilization environment was evaluated by MARAD. It was
concluded that a mobilization of 117 RRF vessels could be
handled by the 66 yards by the late 1980' s and the early
1990' s [Ref. 37: p. 7]. Table 7 is the number of yards and
in what regions they are located.
TABLE 7







Source: Ref. 37: p. 7
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C. CONSUMABLE AND EXPENDABLE STORES
An integrated listing of consumables and expendables
has been compiled by MARAD for most RRF ships. These
listings show, by line items, the required inventories
versus the onhand inventories. Each line item is keyed to
support a different ship department. The listings support
approximately 60% expendable items and 40% consumable items
proportionately [Ref. 35: p. 3-13]. Table 8 lists the total
number of deficient line items for five sample ships from
the Norfolk area. Tables 9, 10, and 11 depict line item
requirements versus onhand inventories for these sample
ships. To fully provision these ships to the required
allowances would demand large replenishment orders by
General Agents.
TABLE 8
LINE ITEM DEFICIENCIES FOR A SAMPLE OF FIVE SHIPS
Ship Name Number of Line Items Deficient
Cape Alava <CA) 1,849
Austral Light ing ' (AL) 1,848
Catawba Victory (CV) 1,551
Chattahoochee (C) 1,841
Pioneer Contractor (PC) 1,867
Source: Stanley Associates, Technical Report 22-86, p. 3-8
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TABLE 9
LINE ITEM (LI) REQUIREMENTS VERSUS ONHAND INVENTORIES
SHIP
Requirement vs.
Inventory Status CA AL CV C PC
Total # of LI
Listed: 2,211 2,343 1,990 2,644 3,081
# of LI with Finite
Rqmt Stated/% of 2,083 2,334 1,990 2,010 2,358
Total # of LI Listed (94%) (100%) (100%) (76%) (77%)
# of LI with a Zero
Rqmt Stated/% of 128 9 634 723
Total # of LI Listed (6%) NIL NIL (24%) (23%)
Source: Stanley Associates, Technical Report 22-86, p. 3-8
TABLE 10
LINE ITEMS (LI) WITH A FINITE STATED REQUIREMENT
SHIP
234 486 439 169 491
(11%) (21%) (22%) (8%) (21%)
Requirement vs.
Inventory Status CA AL CV C PC
# of LI with 100%
or More Coverage of
Stated Rqmt/% of LI
with Stated Rqmt
# of LI with Partial
Coverage of Stated
Rqmt/% of LI with
Stated Rqmt:
# of LI with Zero
Stock Held Against
Stated Rqmt/% of LI 1,749 1,788 1,526 1,767 1,697
with Stated Rqmt: (84%) (77%) (77%) (88%) (72%)
Source: Stanley Associates, Technical Report 22-86, p. 3-8
100 60 25 74 170
(5%) (2%) (1%) (4%) (7%)
62
TABLE 11
LINE ITEMS (LI) VITH A ZERO STATED REQUIREMENT
SHIP
4
NIL NIL NIL (4%) NIL
Requirement vs.
Inventory Status CA AL CV C PC
# of LI with Zero
Rqmt Stated and
Zero Stock Aboard/
% of LI with Zero
Stated Rqmt:
# of LI with Zero
Rqmt Stated but with 128 9 630 723
Stock Aboard/% of LI (100%) (100%) (100%) (99%) (100%)
with Zero Stated Rqmt:
Source: Stanley Associates, Technical Report 22-86, p. 3-8
Consumable and expendable resources are purchased
primarily from commercial supply sources. Due to the large
demand base for these products, suppliers maintain stocks
to meet the customer demand. This implies that there will
be either no lead time or a very short lead time in
acquiring these items.
Charts and navigational publications are considered to
be expendable items. The timely availability of these
might pose a serious problem in a large activation of the
RRF. For a specific item, suppliers normally stock only
one or two. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) would have to
be contacted at the earliest opportunity to supplement what
is available in the civilian market. [Ref. 35: p. 3-203
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D. SUBSISTENCE STORES AND BUNKER
With, the exception of one ship in the RRF, no
subsistence allowance lists exist. Subsistence
requirements would vary from ship to ship as well as from
Agent to Agent. General Agents were presented with
questionnaires to determine the initial loadouts in days of




Item Category Days of Supply
Dry Provisions 120-180
Frozen Provisions 120-180
Meat 8i Poultry 120-180
Fresh Produce 60
Dairy 60-90
Source: Stanley Associates, Technical Report 22-86, p. 3-22
The number of subsistence line items carried by a
merchant ship is approximately 400-425 items. There is
presently a large enough peacetime demand base to support
the RRF in the event of activation. CRef. 35: p. 3-22]
The two primary bunker fuels that will be required for
the RRF are residual bunker and middle grade distillate
bunker. The majority of the ships in the RRF are powered
by steam and will require residual bunker fuel. The
remainder of the ships are diesel-powered and require
middle grade distillate fuel.
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To establish If the bunker requirements would be met in
a mass activation, the activation of 16 RRF ship in the
Norfolk area was simulated. It was assumed that no bunker
fuel was aboard these ships and a full bunker load would be
required. The total requirements for these ships would be
285,540 barrels of residual fuel in the time frame of 20
days [Ref. 35: p. 3-22]. The primary bunker fuel suppliers
in the Norfolk area have a combined storage capacity of
1,014,000 barrels of bunker grade fuels. As long as the
resupply of bunker fuel is uninterrupted at the commercial
fuel terminals, there will be enough bunker fuel available
to support the RRF [Ref. 35: p. 3-23]. All ships of the RRF
are located in areas which support large volumes of
commercial shipping. It can be assumed by the Norfolk
simulation that all of these areas will be able to support
the RRF bunker requirements. There is an extra measure of
bunker assurance if the DOD-owned preposit ioned bunker
stocks are taken into account.
E. OVERSEAS SUPPORT
Until recently strategic sealift has taken a backseat
to strategic airlift when it came to securing Federally-
funded programs. The U.S. Navy, realizing that the
dwindling U.S. maritime posture would ultimately affect the
nation's sealift capability, has committed itself to
increasing the size of the RRF. An increase in government
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owned ships is a step in the right direction, but it alone
will not guarantee a sufficient sealift capability. These
ships must be sustained overseas when mobilized in periods
of crisis. This sustenance will have to include repairs,
resupply, and bunkering.
In times of crisis, the Navy will deploy an afloat
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) (tenders and repair
ships) to the area of conflict. These IMA's will provide
only limited support to the merchant ships of the RRF. The
IMA's are not able to carry all the repair parts which are
unique to each of the differently configured RRF ships.
They are also constrained by the training their personnel
have received in the repair of different merchant vessels.
[Ref. 38: p. 3]
COMSCEUR has provided access to public and private ship
repair facilities for the RRF throughout the European
theater. These facilities, in accordance with numerous
Master Ship Repair Agreements, are under contract to the
Naval Regional Contracting Office, Naples, Italy. Merchant
shipping under MSC operational control will be provided
support in the way of ship maintenance, repair parts and
repairs. In the Western Pacific, the RRF will be supported
by U.S. facilities in Japan, Guam, and the Republic of the
Philippines. There are also numerous foreign-owned ship
repair facilities in Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea
which could provide merchant ship support. [Ref. 38: p. 3]
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The location of the theater of operation will have an
effect on the availability of consumable, expendables,
subsistence, and bunker. If the RRF ships travel the
established trade routes, the availability of these
conunodit ies has been proven by peace time trade [Ref. 35:
p. 4-4] . Various improvisations will be derived if the
theater of operation is in an undeveloped area. The
preposit ioned ships of MSC could supply the bunker and
subsistence to the RRF and the Navy supply and distribution
system could fill the remaining void [Ref. 38: p. 33.
F. RRF SUPPLY SYSTEM
The responsibility for the operation and maintenance of
the RRF ships goes to the General Agents. The General
Agent, who wishes to obtain a spare part to effect a repair
or purchase provisions, must submit a requisition directly
to MARAD for approval. If the spare is not available in
MARAD' s inventory, the General Agent will locate an outside
source of supply. Once the source and part are approved by
KARAD, the General Agent will make the purchase and the
funds expended will be reimbursed by MARAD. Almost all of
the General Agents' costs will be reimbursable.
Reimbursable supply-related costs include spare parts,
equipment, subsistence stores, bunker, consumables,
expendables, transportation, salary, and fringe benefits
[Ref. 35: p. 2-14]
.
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MARAD is not included in the Defense Priorities and
Allocations System (DPAS); therefore, the ships of the RRF,
while under MARAD' s control, do not have a defense rating.
This could present problems for the General Agents in the
case of full scale activation when trying to secure
supplies. A defense rating insures priority over the
commercial customers who are not performing a defense
mission.
MSC does have a defense rating for sealift. Purchase
orders for spare parts initiated by MSC contractors will
receive priority over the General Agents under contract to
MARAD. Once a RRF ship is activated and is ready for
loading, it is assigned to MSC. The ship is then assigned
a Unit Identification Code (UIC) and entered into the Unit
Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system. This will
ensure that the ship' s mission readiness status is reported
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Fleet Commanders in
Chief (FLTCINCs). MSC as a Navy type commander (TYCOM),
Commander Military Sealift Command (COMSC) is responsible
for the logistic support of all ships in his command. This
includes the responsibility of spare parts and other
support items when they are not otherwise available CRef.
35: p. 2-4]
.
Although a RRF ship is tendered to MSC, its General
Agents are still under contract with MARAD. The supply
requisitioning policy of these ships will not change. The
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difference is now that MSC will assist in providing
logistic support to these ships if they are unable to
perform their mission. The procedures for the transfer or
sale of spare parts from a Navy ship to a ship controlled
by MARAD or MSC is found in Afloat Supply Procedures,
NAVSUP P-485 paragraph 5055 [Ref. 35: p. 5-243.
G. SEAL I FT ENHANCEMENT FEATURES
The purpose of the Seal if t Enhancement Features Program
(SEF) is to modify merchant ships with structure and
equipment changes to allow them to perform specific
military missions. The Strategic Sealift Division states
As now planned, the enhancements fall into three
categories. The first is Productivity Enhancements which
expand the capabilities of merchant ships to handle
military cargo by providing increased flexibility for
military support, i.e. , SEA SHEDS, flatracks and
alongside refueling systems. Secondly, Survivability
Enhancements, which provide increased probability of
survival in a hostile environment, include internal
communications and damage control features. Thirdly,
Operational Enhancements will improve coordinated
operations with fleet combatants and support units.
These include communication and lighting requirements for
convoy operations. [Ref. l:p. 373
SEF are being installed on RRF ships over a period of
several years. The SEF modifications will be required
immediately upon mobilization. These features must be
added prior to mobilization or during activation. The SEF
presently being added to RRF ships include Communication
SEF, alongside refueling rigs, underway replenishment
(UNREP) consolidation rigs (breakbulk), UNREP delivery rigs
(breakbulk, container), and general features. General
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features consist of lighterage mooring bitts, cargo tie-
downs, siderails for lighterage, and container hardpoints.
The SEF for the RRF is being progressively funded by the
Navy Strategic Sealift budget [Ref. 37: p. 83. The July 31
1987 report on the status of RRF and TAGS funds shows that
for FY 1987, $6,822,000 was received for the purpose of
Sealift Enhancement [Ref. 39:Enc. 23.
H. CONCLUSION
Once an RRF ship is placed in an operating environment,
supply and logistic support will be obtained. It is the
ships awaiting activation which encounter problems of parts
support. Until MARAD produces an validated inventory of
onhand spare parts, it is impossible to know to what depth
these ships are supported. The civilian market is capable
of handling the surge of activations. With the decline of
merchant shipping in the U.S. , suppliers of consumable,
expendable, and subsistence stores have lost business.
They would gladly meet the demands of RRF activations.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECQIOLENDAT IQNS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Th.e RRF is a valuable asset, which provides fast,
reliable support to deployed military forces. These ships
will provide both surge and resupply shipping in the event
of a contingency. As the size of the active U.S. flag
fleet continues to decline, the military dependence on the
RRF increases proportionately.
For the RRF to perform its assigned mission, supply and
logistical support is required. Another area of importance
is the manning of the ships. If either supply and
logistical support or manning is lacking or insufficient,
these ships cannot be expected to perform their mission.
1
. ManninR
Without trained merchant mariners, these ships
cannot be sailed. However, the number of actively sailing
merchant mariners is declining year after year. This
situation is a result of technological advances, personnel
cut-backs to reduce operational costs, and the decline in
the U.S. flag fleet.
Another problem to be encountered in the manning of
the ships is the skills required of the mariners. The
ships of the RRF tend to be old and less technologically-
advanced. Many are self-sustaining steamships. The seamen
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of today are trained on technologically-advanced, non-self-
sustaining diesel ships. Only the older mariners have the
required expertise to operate the RRF ships and many of
these mariners are near retirement.
Recent studies indicate that manpower shortages
will occur if the entire RRF were to be activated. The
most comprehensive study, the Navy Merchant Marine Manpower
Study of July 1986, forecasted the decline in the U.S. flag
fleet and in merchant mariners and concluded that, in 1992,
shortages could be expected in every field with the
exception of diesel engineers.
2
. Supply and logistics support
The ships of the RRF are facing a crisis in supply
support. Without each ship having a listing of required
spares and other supply items necessary for sustained
operations, it is impossible to determine if they are ready
for mission requirements. This problem is compounded by
the inaccuracies in the spare parts inventories that MARAD
holds. If a ship in a 10 day readiness status requires a
part that has a three week lead time, then the ship's
readiness is really three weeks. This could easily be the
case if a part listed on MARAD' s present inventory is not
there or not in satisfactory condition.
The integrated listings of consumables and
expendables indicate deficiencies which exceed what should
be expected of a ship in a 5 day readiness status. These
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items are available on the conunercial market; therefore,
the General Agents have no excuse for such shortages.
Supply and logistic support is available both in CONUS
and overseas in support of the RRF. They will be able to
perform their assigned missions only if first, MARAD
corrects the inventory problems they now face and second,
if the General Agents assigned to the RRF ships are held
accountable for the ships' readiness.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . ManninR
Chapter IV examined the decline in the merchant
marine and discussed five methods of increasing the number
of actively sailing merchant mariners. Figure 2 is a brief
overview of each method. Based on the five methods, the
following recommendations are offered:
a. First and foremost, measures must be taken to
increase the size of the U.S. flag fleet. Subsidies
and cargo preferences may be used to foster the
growth. Only through a larger fleet can the number
of merchant mariners increase naturally. These
mariners are best qualified to man the RRF ships and
are available during a mobilization as well as a non-
mobilization. Another advantage to the increase in
the number of ships is that a fewer number of RRF
ships will be required; therefore, fewer merchant
mariners will, be required for manning the RRF ships.
b. Second, the Navy and the MSC should consider
contracting out a portion of the auxiliary ships for
merchant mariner manning. If that is unacceptable,
then more Naval auxiliaries could be manned by the
civilian mariners of the MSC. This approach would
increase the number of merchant mariners and provide
them with valuable training. These mariners are






























































Figxire 2 - Overview of Kannlng Concepts
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c. A Merchant Marine Civilian Reserve program should be
established as a back-up source of manpower should
the number of sailing mariners be insufficient to man
the RRF ships. Both licensed and unlicensed and
sailing as well as non-sailing mariners should be
included in the program. The program should ensure
the mariner's skills and licenses or certificates are
kept current and specific training for manning the
RRF ships be provided. These mariners would also be
available in a non-mobilization as well as
mobilization situations.
2
. Supply and loRistics support
a. The supply and inventory problems, which the RRF
faces as described in the conclusions, is being
rectified with a joint working group between MARAD
and MSC. If the ships of the RRF are to be used for
military purposes, a much closer relationship between
MARAD and MSC is needed. The contractors that
operate these ships should have an interface with the
Navy Supply System and access to the government
supply activities. This would not only cut down on
the time to receive parts, but produce a large cost
savings as well.
b. The RRF does not have a standardized supply system.
Each agent determines his ship's needs and locates
his own source of supplies. An accountable supply
system, similar to the Navy's, needs to be developed
and implemented for the RRF. MARAD should also have
a defense rating. Inclusion of the RRF in the
Defense Priorities and Allocation System would
eliminate competition with government agencies of
lower priorities.
c. In each region, there are numerous chandlers who
supply consumables, expendables, and subsistence
stores to merchant ships. Presently, the agents of
RRF ships choose the chandler whom they feel will
fill their needs and then submit a requisition. A
coordinated effort should be made, using the lowest
of three bids, to determine which chandlers will
supply the RRF ships in each region. This will
ensure that stores will be availavble and at
specified contract costs.
d. General agents need to be held accountable for all
items purchased with government money. High cost
spares have been found ordered, never to be used or
needed. High value expendable items such as
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binoculars and navigation equipment are constantly
being replaced due to pilferage. A security system
needs to be Implemented for the control of these
Items.
A final recommendation Is that a ranking system be
developed for critical equipment. Merchant ships,
unlike military ships, normally do not have to be
concerned about mission critical equipment. A
priority ranking system of equipment will ensure
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